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TAXATION-CHARITABLE EXEMPTIONS FROM REAL ESTATE
TAXES-WHAT IS A CHARITY
The plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, brought an action to obtain a tax
refund based upon the contention that since its property was used exclusively
for charitable purposes it was therefore entitled to a property tax exemption.
The plaintiff's articles of incorporation stated that the purpose of the cor-
oration was: "(b) To engage in other benevolent work of a charitable and
religious nature and to participate, so far as circumstances may warrant, in
any activity designed and carried on to promote the general health of the
community."'
Two of the institutions owned by the plaintiff, the Evangelical Lutheran
Good Samaritan Society, were the type generally denominated as "nursing
homes." Any adult twenty-one years of age or older and in need of help or care
was eligible for admission into the Society's homes. The residents of the homes,
who were able, were required to pay for the services rendered. In other cases,
families of the home's residents made such payments. The County Welfare
Department made payments in the case of indigent residents. All charges
were based on the physical and mental condition of the individual residents,
the degree of care required, and the expense incurred in caring for each
resident. The payments made by the Welfare Department were made in
accordance with the statewide rates recommended by the Department of
Public Welfare. Some of the home's residents were apparently charged some-
what more than actual cost, but others were accepted on a basis of less than
cost, depending apparently upon ability to pay. The two nursing homes
operated in some years at a loss and in other years at a small profit. Occa-
sionally small donations of goods, services or cash were received by these
nursing institutions. The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to
a charitable exemption and allowed its claim for a property tax refund.
This decision was affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. County of Gage, 181 Neb. 831, 151
N.W.2d 446 (1967).
With property taxes on the rise, charitable tax exemptions are more valu-
able now than ever before. The problem is that the type of organization in-
volved in the instant case generally does not receive sufficient donations to
support its operations. Thus, to maintain its functions and accept as many
charity patients (residents) as possible, financially responsible patients
must be charged in excess of their cost. Despite contrary opinion, these
organizations claim that their purpose and use is exclusively charitable, and
that they are therefore the proper subject matter of a tax exemption as a
1 Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. County of Gage, 181 Neb. 831, 832,
151 N.W.2d 446, 447 (1967).
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charity. The purpose of this note is to analyze the Evangelical Lutheran case
in light of its contribution to any clarification of the borderline area where
precise denomination of an organization as charitable is not possible.
An understanding of the basic concept of charity is necessarily antecedent
to any discussion of charitable tax exemptions. A distinction must be made
between the popular meaning of the word "charity" and its legal meaning.
In common parlance, the term is usually defined as an act of aid to the
needy.2 Legally, the term is given a more extended significance. While no
precise definition is universally accepted, one of the most comprehensive
was stated by Mr. Justice Gray in Jackson v. Phillips:
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons,
by bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving
their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish
themselves for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or
otherwise lessening the burdens of government.8
While it is recognized that all property owners should equally bear the burden
of government through property taxation, 4 the need for charitable exemptions
to state taxation has also long been recognized. The purpose of such exemp-
tions was discussed in Legat v. Adorno:
The same purpose of the state has been manifest in the exercise of its traditional
power of granting tax exemption to charitable hospitals. This like the grant of
appropriations . . . has never been questioned. The obvious reason is that the
care of the sick is essential to the public welfare. The need cannot be fully met
by reliance solely on private hospitals operating from profit motivation. Provision
for it must be made by charitable hospitals or the state. The grant of tax exemp-
tion to these hospitals . . . encourages and facilitates their performance of a
governmental duty which would otherwise have to be performed by the state. 5
The Nebraska statute, authorized by the state constitution, 6 governing
the principal case states that property will be exempt from taxation if it is
owned and used exclusively for charitable purposes and is not used for
financial gain or profit. 7 The word "exclusively" as used in this statute,
means the primary or dominant use rather than an incidental use.8 There
are no set rules to determine whether an institution is charitable or not, and
2 WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 378 (3d ed. 1961).
3 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1967).
4 Appeal of Price, 88 Okla. 156, 212 P. 424 (1923).
6138 Conn. 134, 144, 83 A.2d 185, 191 (1951).
6 NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
7 NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 202 (1943).
8 The Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W.2d 455 (1965).
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each case must ,be decided on its own individual facts. 9 The majority in
the principal case determined that the nursing homes in question were used
exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of the statute. This
was based on their decision that the homes were enterprises for the good
of humanity and not operated for private gain.
Another factor the court addressed itself to was the fact that some patients
were charged more than actual cost. The court's position was that this did
not deprive the institutions of their charitable character. There is much law
to support this position and the reasoning behind this was discussed in Tulsa
County v. St. John's Hospital:
If these incomes from pay patients and donations are used for the purpose of
caring for or relieving the sick or disabled and increasing the facility for that
purpose, and not used for the purpose of declaring dividends or the financial profit
(other than paying of necessary operating expenses) of those connected with or
having charge of the institution, such is simply an extended use for charitable
purposes. 10
The majority opinion in the principal case reviewed the operations of the
nursing homes in question and, on the basis of this review and their decision
that humanity was being served and no profit motive existed, determined
that these homes were used exclusively for charitable purposes as required
by the statute. It was contended by the dissent in the principal case that
the nursing homes were not exclusively charitable, and that the intent of
the law is not to exempt every nonprofit corporation which may be of some
benefit to mankind. Decisions do support this position; and, simply being a
nonprofit institution is not the same as being a charitable institution." But
it should be pointed out that these cases generally fall into the category of
housing. Typical of these situations is County of Douglas v. OEA Senior
Citizens, Inc.,l2 on which the dissent in the instant case heavily relied. The
institution in the OEA case was a nonprofit home for the aged where an
initial donation was required and predetermined monthly charges for occu-
pancy were made. There was no profit motive involved and the purpose
of the home was to provide services for elderly persons and an educational
program in the field of geriatrics designed to contribute to health, happiness,
and usefulness in longer living. The court denied the home a charitable ex-
emption and declared that the furnishing of low cost housing at its real cost
is not charitable. The dissent in the principal case states that it is difficult
9 Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356, 19 N.E.2d 193 (1939).
10200 Okla. 176, 178, 191 P.2d 983, 985 (1948).
11 Iota Benefit Ass'n v. County of Douglas, 165 Neb. 330, 85 N.W.2d 726 (1957).
Cleveland Branch of Guild of St. Barnabas For Nurses v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150
Ohio St. 484, 83 N.E.2d 229 (1948).
12172 Neb. 696, 111 N.W.2d 719 (1961).
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to see how the Evangelical Lutheran case can be distinguished from the
OEA case.
While similarities do exist between the two factual situations, a distinction
may be drawn. The OEA case deals mainly with housing. In the principal
case the court analogized nursing homes to hospitals, where a variety of
services are performed. But why do certain courts hold housing not to be
a charitable use of property? Generally it is not the purpose of these old
people's homes to provide housing for indigents and charity cases at reduced
rates. Patrons are not charged on ability to pay but instead pay their share
of the costs of operation. It is contended that these homes do not relieve the
government of any burden. As stated in a recent decision: "Here, we have
an enterprise to furnish low cost housing to a certain segment of our popu-
lation. It was intended to be self supporting, without any thought that
gifts or charity were involved. Also . . . there was no evidence that the
public is relieved of any expense in comparison with the loss of tax revenue." 1
This opinion follows other decisions with the same line of reasoning. 14 One
case directly stated that it is not the duty of the government to furnish
homes to older adults.15
The dissenting opinion in Evangelical Lutheran contended that the majority
holding would allow every nursing home in the state to avoid taxation by
incorporating as a nonprofit corporation and still withdraw all profits in
salaries and expenses. An almost identical situation took place in Malone-
Hogan Hospital Clinic Foundation, Inc. v. The City of Big Spring", where a
hospital claimed an exemption as a nonprofit charitable institution. Certain
doctors fixed their salaries depending upon the profits of the hospital. The
court said this was a question of fact, and if the fixing of salaries was merely
a device for securing profits then the institution was not entitled to a
charitable exemption.
The law of Illinois on this matter is in several respects quite similar to
the Nebraska statute which was the center of the court's attention.' 7 Property
13Mountain View Home, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 77 N.M. 649, 655, 427 P.2d 13,
17 (1967).
14Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d 135, 214 N.E.2d 431
(1966). Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1965).
15Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Independent School Dist., 410 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966).
16 288 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
17ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 500.7 (1965), exempts "... all property of beneficent
and charitable organizations . . . when such property is actually and exclusively used
for such charitable or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a
view to profit .... " NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 202 (1943), reads as follows: "(1.) The
following property shall be exempt from taxes: . . . (c) Property owned and used
exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery purposes, when such prop-
erty is not owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or user .... 
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used exclusively for charitable or beneficent purposes is exempt from taxa-
tion.18 In Illinois, as in Nebraska, the word "exclusively" means the primary
use, not an incidental use.19 Illinois law differs, however, in one material
respect. In Nebraska the use of property does not have to be "exclusively"
charitable, religious, or educational. These areas of tax exemption are not
distinct and mutually exclusive. Property may be concomitantly used for
all three, and the question of proportion of use is not raised.20 In Illinois the
property must not only be used exclusively for charitable purposes, it must
also be owned by a charitable organization. That is, in Illinois, the property
must be used exclusively for one exempted purpose or no exemption is given.
In one case a charitable hospital was denied a tax exemption because it was
owned by a religious organization.21
This dictinction between Illinois and Nebraska law is quite important
when applied to the principal case. The decision would turn on the question
of whether the Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society is a religious
or charitable organization.
The absence of a profit motive is important in Illinois. Similar to Nebraska,
the Illinois exemption statute specifically rules out property with a view
towards profit.2 2 Also in Illinois, as in other jurisdictions, those who are
able to pay may be charged without defeating the charitable character of
the organization. 23
As stated previously, the instant case is close to the thin line dividing ex-
clusively charitable and not exclusively charitable organizations. In analyzing
this case and similar fact situations it is important that not too much reliance
be put on any one prior decision. Instead a study of many decisions is needed
before a pattern can be set. One case which most explicitly sets a standard
is Oregon Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Horn.24 In this case the Oregon Supreme
Court surveyed its past decisions to find what elements had received their
consideration in persuading them to a conclusion that the entity was or
was not a charity. The court found the following six elements, which can
also be found in the decisions of other jurisdictions:
i8 Id.
19 First Nat'l Bank of Danville v. Ryan, 23 Ill. 2d 250, 177 N.E.2d 854 (1961)
People ex rel. Marsters v. Rev. Saletyni Missionaries, 409 Ill. 370, 99 N.E.2d 186 (1951)
Turnverein "Lincoln" v. Board of Appeals of Cook County, 358 Ill. 135, 192 N.E. 780
(1934).
20 Supra note 8.
21 People ex rel. Wilson v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Hosp. of Centralia, 306 Ill. 174,
137 N.E. 865 (1922).
2 2 Supra note 17.
23 Congregational Sunday School & Publishing Soc. v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108,
125 N.E. 7 (1919).
24226 Ore. 298, 360 P.2d 293 (1961).
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(1) Whether the receipts are applied to the upkeep, maintenance and equip-
ment of the institution or are otherwise employed
(2) Whether patients or patrons receive the same treatment irrespective of
their ability to pay
(3) Whether the doors are open to rich and poor alike and without discrimi-
nation as to race, color or creed
(4) Whether charges are made to all patients and, if made, are lesser charges
made to the indigent
(5) Whether there is a charitable trust fund created by benevolent and chari-
tably-minded persons for the needy or donations made for the use of such persons
(6) Whether the institution operates without profit or private advantage to its
founders and the officials in charge.25
The court then stated that the foregoing factors do not all have to be present
before a given institution can be declared charitable. Also, the list does not
include all items which may assist an institution in obtaining a charitable
exemption.
The decision in Evangelical Lutheran represents the law in the majority
of American jurisdictions. In a recent decision rendered in Louisiana,26 the
court observed that there is an increasing antithetical trend. A study of cases
decided during the last ten years does not support this contention. 27 The
area is still one of unpredictability. While it is helpful to have criteria
laid down by a court applied to a particular factual situation, the result of
a court's applying these criteria cannot be predicted with any accuracy.
The decision in the noted case could have gone the other way and nursing
homes in the same situation cannot take heart because the court might
reach a different conclusion on a similar set of facts. The borderline area is
difficult to delineate and unfortunately the principal case does not add much
light to the problem.
Michael Lurie
25 Holmes v. Horn, 226 Ore. 298, 309, 360 P.2d 293, 298 (1961) (internal citations
omitted).
26 Ruston Hosp. Inc. v. Riser, 191 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1966).
27 Vick v. Cleveland Memorial Medical Found., 2 Ohio St. 2d 30, 206 N.E.2d 2
(1965); Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Shawnee
County, 195 Kan. 90, 402 P.2d 802 (1965); Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v.
Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1963); City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp.,
202 Va. 86, 116 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
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